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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS*
By
JOSEPH P. MCKEEHAN
It is not the purpose of the writer to discuss with any degree of thorough-
ness any portion of the Statute of Frauds, but it is intended merely to call
attention to some pecularities of the law in Pennsylvania, as compared with
the law of other states, and to note the statutes in force in Pennsylvania re-
quiring a writing to establish certain contracts and as a condition of certain other
rights.
The English Statute (29 Car. II., c. 3) enacted in 1677, was divided into
twenty-four sections.' The first section provided that all parol transfers of
interests in land and not put in writing and signed by the party making the at-
tempted transfer or his agent authorized by writing should make the transferee
a tenant at will only, and this regardless of the consideration given and not-
withstanding the former custom of making transfers of estates in land by livery
and seizin. The second section excepted all leases which by their terms expired
not later than three years from the date of their making (with a further qual-
ification as to the rent reserved). The third section added to grants of interests
in land the assignment or surrender of such interests and forbad such transfer
"unless by deed or note in writing signed by the party so assigning, granting, or
surrendering the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing,
or by act and operation of law." The familiar fourth section forbids actions
against an executor or administrator on his express promise to be personally
responsible for a debt of the estate, actions upon promises to pay the debt of
another, actions upon ante-nuptial agreements, actions upon agreements to
sell land or interests therein and actions upon any agreement not to be performed
within a year from the making. Sections 5, 6, 12 and 19 to 24 inclusive relate
to wills. Section 7 to 11, inclusive, relate to declarations of or creations of trusts.
Section 13 to 15, inclusive, relate to the signing and dating of judgments.
Section 16 relates to executions. Section 18 relates to certain recognizances. Sec-
tion 25 relates to the estates of intestate married women.
The seventeenth section was the familiar one requiring that in order to
be "good" a contract for the sale of goods "for the price of ten pounds or
upwards", must be evidenced by "some note or memorandum in writing of
the said bargain, ""signed by the parties to be charged by such contract, or their
agents thereunto lawfully authorized."
*Re-printed from 25 Dick. L. Rev. 63 (1920).
1 29 A. & E. Encyc. of Law P. 801.
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In Ewing vs. Tees, 1 Binney 450, Chief Justice Tilghman, after quoting
the Pennsylvania Statutes of March 21, 1772: 1 Sm. L. 389, sec. 1, 2 Purdon
1754, says: "It is plain that our legislature had that (i. e. the English Statute)
before them, when they framed the act in question; because that part of our law
which I have recited, is copied very nearly verbatim from the English law.
But there is a total omission of the fourth section of the English statute, etc."
He accordingly held that there was no reason why an action for damages could
not be maintained in Pennsylvania for breach of a contract for the sale of land.
It is a curious fact that the fourth clause of the fourth section of the English
statute relating to contracts for the sale of lands has been adopted in all the
United States except Pennsylvania. 2 The fact remains that the Courts of Penn-
sylvania have always refused to enforce specifically a parol contract for the sale
of land, at the suit of either party thereto. Various reasons have been given
and a failure to appreciate the true reason has occasionally led judges of even
our appellate courts to make incorrect and misleading statements.
"The Vendee's Remedies for Vendor's Non-conveyance," first when the
contract is written, and second when it is oral, have been reviewed in an able
article in 11 Dickinson Law Review, p. 171. So also the "Vendor's Remedies for
Vendee's Breach of Contract," both under written and oral contracts, have been
covered in an article in 1I Dickinson Law Review, p. 195. We will merely refer
thle reader to these articles and to a summary in concise form in 13 Dickinson
Law Review at page 221.
The Act of Apr. 22d, 1856, P. L. 533, 2 Purdon 1757, the fourth section
of which forbad the creation of express trusts by parol, in its fifth section
required contracts for the sale of land to be in writing. The latter section was
repealed, however, by the Act of May 13th. 1857, P. L. 500. This provision
of the English statute has never been law in Pennsylvania except for this brief
period. The English statute requires that the agreement, or some memorandum
or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged there-
with, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." It is obvious
that to specifically enforce an oral promise to transfer an interest in land would
be to give greater effect to a promise than may be given to livery and seizin.
This is why the courts require the vendor's promise to be in writing and signed
by him or his agent authorized in writing. To get title to the land the vendee
must not have less than is required by the Act of 1772. We are, therefore, surprised
to find a judge of our Superior Court Say: "The requirements of the statute
are answered by a memorandum in writing signed by the party to be charged
therewith." s The fact is that a vendor cannot recover the price from the vendee,
who has signed the contract, if the vendor himself has not signed, for want
S 29 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law P. 1886.
4 Schultz v Burlo&, 6 Super. '74.
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of mutuality. So again a Justice of the Supreme Court has resorted to the fourth
section of the Act of 1856 relating to express trusts to find the reason for
requiring contracts for the sale of land to be in writing in Pennsylvania. See
S. Dep. & T. Co. vs. Coal & Coke Co., 234 Pa. at 108.
It has always been held in Pennsylvania that the agent of a vendor must
have written authority but the agent of a guarantor need not. Compare Vanhorne
vs. Fricke, 6 S. & R. 90, and Martin vs. Duffy, 4 Phila. 75. The only reason
for such a difference is that the Act of 1772 expressly requires the agent of
the grantor or lessor to have written authority. The Act of 1856 says nothing
about the form of the authority of an agent. It is especially curious to find
such an old rule of law as that forbidding specific enforcement of an oral sale
attributed to as recent a statute as the Act of 1856 and it is a coincidence that
that very statute should have had a section in it relating to contracts for sale
of land, which was stricken out the following year. The remarkable way in which
the justice omits the words showing the true subject of the fourth section, in
order to make it serve his purpose, is also noteworthy.
Another case in which a Supreme Court Justice exhibited his confusion
of ideas is found in Twitchell vs. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 212. At p. 220, Justice
Read says: "It is an essential requisite by our Act of Assembly in a contract for
the purchase of lands, in order to enable a vendor to enforce specific performance
of it, that the agent of the purchaser be authorized by writing." As a matter
of fact, since purchasers do not sign conveyances, they need not sign contracts
of purchase and an oral authority to an agent to sign is perfectly good. Con-
tracts signed by the vendor only are specifically enforceable by both parties,
while those signed by the vendee only are not specifically enforceable by either.
Only two provisions of the fourth section of the English statute are
part of the law of Pennsylvania. These were enacted on April 26, 1855, P. L.
308, 2 Purdon 1759. They are the two first provisions relating to promises by
executors or administrators and promises to answer for the debt or default of
another. For a full discussion of this statute and the construction placed upon it,
see the article in 24 Dickinson Law Review 223.
This statute was followed the next year by the statute of April 22, 1856,
P. L; 532, 2 Purdon 1757, the fourth section of which declares that both de-
clarations or creations of trusts of land and all grants and assignments thereof,
"shall be manifested by writing, signed by the party holding the title thereof, or
by his last will in writing, or else to be void," excepting however resulting
and constructive trusts. A parol declaration of trust as to personal estate is not
within the statute.
On June 12th, 1878, (P. L. 205), 4 Purdon 4044, a statute was passed which
provided that a grantee of real estate should not be personally liable for the
payment of an encumbrance which bound tht land when granted, "unless he
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shall, by an agreement in writing, have expressly assumed a liability therefore, or
there shall be express words in the deed of conveyance stating that the grant is
made on condition of the grantee assuming such personal liability." It further
provided that "the use of the words, 'under and subject to the payment of
such ground rent, mortgage or other encumbrance,' shall not alone be so con-
strued as to make such grantee personally liable." The second section of the
act requires the holder of the encumbrance to be a party to the agreement as-
.%uming personal liability, if he is to enforce it, and terminated the personal
liability upon a second grant of the encumbered property in the absence of a
further agreement continuing such liability. The attempts of the Supreme Court
to construe this act have been so conflicting that it has been declared to be
"absolutely unintelligible." See 18 Dickinson Law Review, at page 172. Prior
to this act a verbal promise of a grantee of encumbered real estate made to his
grantor to pay the mortgage debt, though the grantor himself was not personally
bound, was held enforceable by the creditor though he was not a party to
such contract. Merriman vs. Moore, 90 Pa. 78. It was not contended that such
a promise came within the Act of 1855 relating to promises to'pay the debt of
another.
On June 8, 1881, (P. L. 84) an act was passed which precluded proof
of a parol agreement that a deed for real estate was intended to take effect as a
mortgage. A defeasance must have been made at the time the deed was made,
be in writing, signed, sealed, acknowledged and delivered by the grantee in the
deed to the grantor and be recorded within sixty days from the date of execution.
Prior to this act deeds could be converted into mortgages by parol testimony.
Pearson vs. Sharp, 115 Pa. 254. This act was used to perpetrate the grossest
frauds upon unschooled borrowers of money. For a scathing condemnation of
the act, see 11 Dick. L. Rev. 93. It was amended by the Act of April 22, 1909,
P. L. 137, 5 Purdon 5908, requiring only that the agreement of defeasance be
signed and delivered to the grantor in the deed. As against the holder of the
deed, it may now be made subsequently to the deed. It may not have been sealed
nor acknowledged nor recorded. But as against a later grantee or mortgagee
for value, it must have been recorded before the subsequent deed or mortgage.
In its present form it may be hoped that the statute will prevent more frauds
than it occasions. See 15 Dick. L. Rev. at page 83.
On May 10th, 1881, P. L. 17, 3 Purdon 3306, the first statute was passed
requiring acceptances of drafts to be in writing, "signed by the acceptor or
his lawful agent." Like the act relating to promises to pay the debt of another
it excepted transactions involving less than twenty dollars. The 132d section
of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1901, P. L. 194, 3 Purdon 3305, merely
provides that the acceptance of a bill must be in writing and signed by the drawee.
Sections 30 and 31 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provide that bills
and notes payable to order may be negotiated only by the indorsement of the
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holder written on the instrument iLscif or upon a paper attached thereto. Like
provisions may be found in the Uniform Commercial Acts with reference to
the transfer of title to a certificate of stock, (Sec. I of Act of May 5, 1911, P. L.
page 126) to an order bill of lading, (Sec. 34 of Act of June 9th, 1911, P. L.
page 838), and to an order warehouse receipt, (Sec. 43 of Act of March 11,
1909, P. L. page 18). Section 16 of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act requires
that authority to alter a bill of lading must be written or the alteration is void.
Section 9, b, of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act requires that one must
have written authority from the one to whom the goods are deliverable by the
terms of a non-negotiable receipt or the warehouseman is not justified in making
delivery.
Section 47, 3d sub-section, of the Uniforn Sales Act, as amended in Penn-
sylvania, Act of May 19, 1915 P. L. 543, 6 Purdon 7480 provides that when
a buyer of goods directs or szecs that they be shipped C. 0. D., the buyer is
not entitled to examine the goads before payment of the price, in the absence
of agre'emen t and proper written .uthority to the carrier permitting such ex-
amination.
The words printed in italics type are not part of the form Sales Act as
drafted by the commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Section 122 of the Negqtiable Instnrments, Act requiLes that if the holder
of such an instrument would renpunce his rights against any party to the instru-
ment, it must be in writing, unless the instrument be delivered up to the
person primarily liable thercon.
Certain notices are required to be in writing. For c:rample, a surety in a
written promise to pay money at r future t'ime shall nct hie discharged from
liabiliby by reason of notice to the creditor to collect frori the principal, unless
such notice be in writing and sighiwdA by the principal. Act of May 14, 1874,
P. L. page 157, 3 Purdon 3661. So too when a lease is for less than one year,
or by the month, or for an indeterminate time, if the landlord desires to regain
possession, he shall serve a notice in writing. Act of !,..arch 31st, 1905, P. L. 87,
6 Purdon 6513.
It will be remembered that the Act of 1856, requiring express trusts of land
t6 be in writing 'excepted resulting trusts. But by the Act of June 4th, 1901, P.
L. page 425, 2 Purdon 1758, it is provided that if a resulting trust arise in land
by reason of the payment of the purchase money by one person and the taking
of the legal title in the name of another, and the person advancing the purchase
money has capacity to contract, the trust shall be void as to bona fide judgment
or other creditors or mortgagees of the holder of the legal title or purchasers
from him without notice, unless a declaration of trust in writing has been exe-
cuted and adcowledged by the holder of the legal title and recorded in the county
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where the land is or unless the one advancing the purchase money has begun
an action of ejectment in said county.
The 17th section of the English statute relating to sales of goods was
no part of the law of Pennsylvania until the Uniform Sales Act was passed on
May 19th, 1915, P. L. page 543, 6 Purdon 7473. The fourth section of the
Sales Act provides that, "A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in
action of the value of five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforce-
able by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action
so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same, or give something
in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or mem-
orandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged
or his agent in that behalf." The most conspicuous change from the English
Statute is, of course, the raising of the amount to which the statute applies from
ten pounds to five hundred dollars. But a comparison of the language will dis-
close five changes in phraseology, all working for greater clearness and amply
justified in his discussion of this section of the act by the learned draftsman. See
Williston on Sales, pages 59 to 154.
it is not pretended that the foregoing is a complete list of the Pennsylvania
statutes because of which the omission of a writing may prove fatal to a party's
rights but it has been thought that, as so few of the statutes mentioned are col-
lected in the digests under the title, "Statute of Frauds," it would serve a useful
purpose if they were collected and attention called to the fact that they are
all statutes enacted with the same purpose in view, namely to render it more
difficult to enforce a pretended right by means of false testimony.
